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Abstract
A long-standing charge of circularity against regularity accounts of laws has 
recently seen a surge of renewed interest. The difficulty is that we appeal to laws 
to explain their worldly instances, but if these laws are descriptions of regularities 
in the instances then they are explained by those very instances. By the transitivity 
of explanation, we reach an absurd conclusion: instances of the laws explain them-
selves. While drawing a distinction between metaphysical and scientific explana-
tions merely modifies the challenge rather than resolving it, I argue that it does point 
us towards an attractive solution. According to Humeanism, the most prominent 
form of the regularity view, laws capture information about important patterns in the 
phenomena. By invoking laws in scientific explanations, Humeans are showing how 
a given explanandum is subsumed into a more general pattern. Doing so both under-
mines a principle of transitivity that plays a crucial role in the circularity argument 
and draws out a central feature of the Humean approach to scientific explanation.
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1 Introduction
One of the most influential accounts of laws of nature is the regularity account, 
which takes the laws to be descriptions of regularities that occur in the world. This is 
most commonly associated with Humeanism, understood here as a rejection of irre-
ducible necessity in nature. However, the Humean approach to laws has long been 
subject to the criticism that the laws it offers fail to back the sorts of explanation 
that we standardly take laws to be involved in.1 This criticism has recently seen a 
resurgence of interest, and a corresponding flurry of papers have been published on 
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the matter.2 The aim of this paper is to identify a crucial feature of Humean laws 
that underwrites their ability to support the explanations we find in both folk and 
scientific practice. Since the resulting explanations do not support a principle of 
transitivity crucial to the circularity objection, I claim that this feature is one which 
all successful Humean responses to the challenge ought to share in. By focusing 
on this commonality in Humean accounts rather than the specifics of one in par-
ticular, it is hoped that this defence will be compatible with a range of pre-existing 
commitments.3
While this is an area of recent interest, the debate is a long-standing one and so 
suffers from differences in how its participants set up the problem, make distinctions 
and express their own claims. As such, the early sections of the paper will be pri-
marily focused on laying out exactly what the main issue at stake is. Only once this 
has been accomplished will we be in a position to show that Humeans can use the 
notion of pattern subsumption to respond to the circularity argument. The next sec-
tion begins with a recap of the most well-known Humean account of laws, the Best 
System Account, and then turns to the motivation behind the accusations of circu-
larity. Barry Loewer’s distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations 
has shaped much of the recent debate in this area and Sect. 3 offers an illustration 
of this important distinction. In response to Loewer, it has been argued that these 
forms of explanation are connected by a principle of transitivity. Since we can chain 
metaphysical and scientific explanations together to form new scientific explana-
tions, the Humean account is still subject to a revised circularity argument (Sect. 4). 
The advantage to approaching the issue in this way is that it clearly indicates what 
the challenge is: Humeans must reject one of the premises of the revised circular-
ity argument without thereby having to reject all cases of chained explanations that 
occur in scientific practice.
The paper then shifts to a diagnosis of the central issue and argues that the sense 
of explanation at play is an inappropriately strong one (Sect.  5). In particular, it 
requires the laws appealed to by an explanation to play a non-Humean role: they 
must be responsible for the mosaic’s being the way that it is. As there is another 
sense of explanation available, one based on identifying events as instances of a 
broader pattern, Humeans are free to reject the one present in the circularity argu-
ment. Moreover, given the Humean conception of what roles laws are capable of 
playing and which aspects of the world are explicable, they have motivation to do so 
that is independent of the circularity debate. In Sect. 6, the paper then connects this 
proposal to three more specific accounts of scientific explanation and demonstrates 
that each can make sense of the chaining examples used to motivate the transitiv-
ity principle. The conclusion reiterates the central claim of this proposal: Humean 
3 And so might be contrasted with more controversial solutions, like the ‘contrarian’ Humean in Miller 
(2015).
2 Lange (2013) provides the main contemporary case against Humean laws and explanations. Hicks and 




explanations have pattern subsumption as a central characteristic and this feature 
undermines the transitivity principle that the circularity argument depends upon.4
2  Humeanism and the circularity argument
The Humean denial of necessary connections blocks off certain views about the 
nature of scientific laws. As metaphysically productive concepts like governance 
are not obviously available on this view, Humeanism is associated with regularity 
accounts of law.5 The most popular way of then distinguishing between lawful and 
accidental regularities is the Best System Account.6 According to this account, the 
various ways in which we can systematise truths about the world differ with respect 
to how informative and how simple they are. These two virtues trade off against 
each other, as including more facts about the world strengthens the system at the 
price of making it less simple. The system that achieves the best balance of theoreti-
cal virtues gives us the laws. More specifically, the laws are the universal generalisa-
tions included as axioms in the best systematisation of the world’s facts. Let’s call 
the collection of facts that determine the laws ‘the mosaic’.7
One of the roles commonly ascribed to laws is that they must be able to explain 
their instances. But, goes the objection, this is something that the regularity view 
of laws cannot give us. The core worry is that the laws are what they are in vir-
tue of the way the world is, and hence they cannot explain why the world is that 
way. Attempts to do so are guilty of circular reasoning. If the fundamental state of 
the world explains the fundamental laws, then we cannot immediately turn around 
and explain the world’s state by appeal to these very laws. Otherwise we would be 
claiming that the fundamental state of the world explains itself, only with the addi-
tional use of laws as an intermediary.
This is an objection commonly voiced by anti-Humeans.8 It has some intuitive 
force to it. Take Coulomb’s law, which describes the electrostatic force between 
charged particles. A straightforward consequence of the law is that all positively 
5 See Beebee (2000). For an argument that it is still possible to maintain that Humean laws govern in an 
interesting sense, see Roberts (2008).
6 See Lewis (1983, pp. 365–368). While the Best System Account has been criticised and refined in 
various ways, the basic form is sufficient for the purposes of this paper.
7 The aim of this broad characterisation is to avoid the controversies about the precise nature of the facts 
within the mosaic. While the connection between the mosaic and the laws was originally stated in terms 
of supervenience, it is not uncommon to see contemporary Humeans talk in terms of grounding. See, for 
example, Bhogal and Perry (2017) and Loew and Jaag (2020).
8 For example, Lange (2013, p. 256) and Maudlin (2007, p. 172).
4 The phrasing of pattern subsumption might suggest a unificationist reading of this proposal but the 
terminology is more widely applicable. Hempel (1965, p. 488) describes the deductive-nomological 
account in terms of subsumption under a system of uniformities. Woodward (2003, p. 191) summarises 
explanation on the counterfactual account as ‘exhibiting systematic patterns of counterfactual depend-
ence’. As neither of these views are standardly understood as unificationist, I take pattern subsumption to 
be a broader ‘umbrella’ term that covers views which see unification as the aim of explanation in addition 
to views which see it as aiming at other ends.
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charged particles repel one another. Suppose that, upon considering some experi-
mental setup, I were to ask why the two particles in the experiment repelled one 
another. Our usual way of thinking about scientific laws suggests an immediate 
answer to the question: these particles repel each other because both are positively 
charged and it is a law that positively charged particles repel.9 In other words, an 
instance of the law is explained by appeal to that law. However, anyone who pro-
vides an account of laws that takes them to be regularities faces a problem here. If 
the law that all positively charged particles repel each other is a law because it is a 
regularity—perhaps one that possesses other features, such as being a part of the 
best systematisation of the world’s facts—then the reason it holds at all is ultimately 
because of the fact that there are positively charged particles and the fact that they 
repel each other. But if the reason that these particles repel is because of the law and 
the reason that there is such a law is because of the repelling particles, then we have 
an explanatory circle going on. For one of the law’s instances is a partial explana-
tion of the law and so at least a partial explanation of itself. And self-explanation is 
a high cost for Humeanism to bear, perhaps one that indicates that we do not have a 
genuine explanation of the phenomenon after all.
In order to assess the options open to Humeans, it will be useful to have a clear 
statement of exactly what this argument for explanatory circularity is. Hicks and van 
Elswyk provide a particularly clear formalisation of the objection:
 (P1) The natural laws are generalisations.
 (P2) The truth of generalisations is (partially) explained by their positive instances.
 (P3) The natural laws explain their instances.
 (P4) If A (partially) explains B and B (partially) explains C, then A (partially) 
explains C.
 (C1) The natural laws are (partially) explained by their positive instances.
 (C2) The instances of laws explain themselves (Hicks and van Elswyk 2015, p. 434).
While it might be more accurate to say that the instances of laws (partially) explain 
themselves, the problem this argument raises for the Humean account is evident. 
Even partial self-explanation would be an undesirable consequence of a regularity 
theory of laws. Worse, the tension between the Humean grounding of laws in the 
mosaic and transitivity allows problem cases to multiply. If the reason why these 
particles repel is because it is a law that all positively charged particles do so, and 
this is a law partially because of each instance of positively charged particles mov-
ing in such a manner, then the fact that particles a century from now will repel one 
another is part of the explanation why these particles do so.10 This is a strong claim, 
10 This is suggested by Miller (2015, pp. 1324–1325) and echoed by both Marshall (2015, p. 3152) and 
Lange (2018).
9 One might supplement these two claims according to one’s favoured account of explanation. For exam-
ple, on Woodward’s (2003) counterfactual account of explanation, one would also point out that the law-
fulness of this generalisation is relevant because it tells us a counterfactual dependence relation has been 




and at the very least it would be better for Humeans to not be forced into accepting 
it.
3  Metaphysical and scientific explanations
According to one influential response to this argument, for Humeanism about laws 
to be guilty of an explanatory circle, the explanations appealed to must be of the 
same kind. If we use A to explain B and then use B to explain A in the same kind of 
way, then, intuitively, there is something wrong with the explanation being offered. 
But if B is used to explain A in a different kind of way from the first case, then intui-
tion may not tell against this. To put it another way, we might be prepared to grant 
that the transitivity principle in (P4) of the formalised argument holds for one kind 
of explanation, but resist the claim that transitivity will hold across different kinds of 
explanation. That is exactly the approach that I will describe in this section.
For this to work when applied to laws, of course, we will need to see some details 
as to exactly what the different kinds of explanation appealed to are supposed to 
be. Loewer (2012, p. 131) has suggested that there is such a distinction between 
metaphysical and scientific explanations.11 Metaphysical explanations are concerned 
with constitution in some way. To say that A metaphysically explains B is to say that 
B is grounded in A, or that B holds in virtue of A or that B is constituted by A.12 An 
explanation of this sort does not need to cite laws. If explanans and explanandum are 
both temporal entities, then they must be co-temporal. This latter point captures the 
following idea: if we want to say that A is the underlying stuff out of which we get 
B then they clearly must both exist at the same time. It would make little sense to 
claim that B is constituted by something no longer around.
Scientific explanations do not need to mention grounds in that way. Rather, 
Loewer suggests that the core of scientific explanation of some event is showing 
why that event occurred through appeal to other events and certain laws. If B scien-
tifically explains A, then events mentioned in B will typically be temporally prior to 
events in A. That said, this is not a strict requirement since there is no requirement 
that the explanans or the explanandum be temporally located entities. Another dif-
ference between the two kinds of explanation is that scientific explanations may be 
probabilistic while metaphysical ones cannot. The thermodynamic explanation of 
the melting of an ice cube in warm water proceeds by way of showing that this melt-
ing is highly probable, yet there does not seem to be an equivalent for constitutive 
explanations: if we claim that the water in that ice cube consists of  H2O molecules, 
notions like chance or probability do not appear to have any role to play.
This is far from a full account of scientific explanation and is likely inspired by 
features drawn from different accounts. That said, it is not intended to be a single 
complete account. Loewer is instead trying to give some characterisation of what 
11 See also his (2007).
12 More details about the contemporary notion of grounding can be found in Fine (2012) and Rosen 
(2010). The link between grounding and explanation specifically is considered in Jansson (2016).
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the kind of scientific explanation he has in mind is. To see how it is distinct from 
metaphysical explanation, let’s consider the example of Arbuthnot’s regularity.13 
The regularity which forms our explanandum is simple: over an 82-year span from 
1623 onwards, more boys than girls were born in London. Calling this mere coinci-
dence is hardly credible given how unlikely this is to have come about by chance. 
But there are two kinds of explanation on offer for this regularity. Take the meta-
physical explanation first. We may not have such an explanation presently available, 
but we can sketch out the form it might take. Begin by taking the exact states of all 
of the fundamental physical particles across 1623. Associate some distributions of 
particles with the birth of a boy and some other distributions with the birth of a girl. 
Count the number of boy-birth distributions and compare it to the number of girl-
birth distributions. Repeat for the remaining 81 years. We can clearly see that more 
boys than girls were born in London each year!
There is a sense in which this constitutes an explanation of the Arbuthnot regu-
larity. We have given the details (or, at least, the form such details take) of what the 
regularity might fundamentally consist in. The regularity obtains in virtue of such-
and-such fundamental physical facts. But it is also easy to see what this explanation 
misses. Most obviously, it is an ‘in principle’ explanation: we do not have epistemic 
access to the world’s fundamental state for any of the relevant years nor we do not 
believe we have an account of what a childbirth distribution would fundamentally 
consist in. However, even if we had all of this information available to us, the expla-
nation would still be missing out on something. The offered explanation does noth-
ing to help us understand why the regularity is not some big coincidence: why this 
particular fundamental distribution that generates the Arbuthnot regularity when so 
many others are possible? Furthermore, the explanation explains too much. For this 
appeal to a fundamental distribution not only explains the Arbuthnot regularity but 
also every other event and regularity that occurs during the relevant time period. So 
the very same explanans will feature in an explanation of the Great Fire of London, 
the publication of Descartes’ Meditations, and the rise and fall of alien empires in 
other galaxies. The sense in which this is an explanation of the Arbuthnot regularity 
is perhaps a rather slim one.
So, there is plenty of room for an alternative to the metaphysical explanation just 
given. Contrast this with Fisher’s neo-Darwinian explanation of the regularity. In 
any population which differs from a 1:1 ratio at sexual maturity, there is a selection 
pressure in favour of producing more offspring of the sex that is not as well repre-
sented. If one sex in a population is more vulnerable than the other, and so less likely 
to reach sexual maturity, natural selection will favour a birth ratio skewed towards 
the more vulnerable sex. In humans, males are more vulnerable than females: boys 
are more likely to die before puberty than girls. Any large human population which 
fails to birth more boys will experience a selection pressure towards having more 
13 A discussion of Arbuthnot’s regularity and explanation can be found in Kitcher (2001, p. 71). See 
Frisch (2011) for further discussion. The relevance of this example to Loewer’s distinction was first 
brought to my attention in a talk by John Roberts.
1 3
Synthese 
boys. This is why Arbuthnot observed this regularity; because of natural selection, 
every year is likely to be a year in which more boys are born than girls.
There are several differences in the character of the explanations just sketched. 
On Fisher’s explanation, the regularity in the London births no longer appears to be 
a coincidence, but rather something we should expect to hold. This is because it has 
greater predictive power than the metaphysical one: we can use it to form beliefs 
about what would happen in relevantly similar counterfactual situations. Relatedly, 
it is less sensitive to the precise details of the background conditions. While neither 
explanation lends itself well to aiding us in manipulating the world so as to have 
brought about a different outcome, the scientific explanation does a better job of 
highlighting which features would need to be intervened upon if this were to occur.14 
The variety of the explananda covered also differs. The scientific explanation does 
explain more than just a regularity in seventeenth-century London—it explains simi-
lar birth trends across different places and times—but it explains far less than the 
metaphysical explanation does. By appealing to the entire fundamental state, the lat-
ter explains every regularity that occurs in that 82-year period.
4  The revised circularity argument
A challenging line of response is given by Lange (2013, 2018). Grant that there is 
a distinction between scientific and metaphysical explanations. Grant also that the 
holding of some explanatory relation between A and B, and another explanatory 
relation between B and A does not automatically entail that either explanation is 
viciously circular. Even so, Loewer’s distinction will not save the Humean account. 
The problem is that these two kinds of explanation are connected to one another by a 
transitivity principle. Here is the original statement of it:
If E scientifically explains [or helps to scientifically explain] F and D grounds 
[or helps to ground] E, then D scientifically explains [or helps to scientifically 
explain] F (Lange 2013, p. 256).
The motivation for this update to our first transitivity principle is straightforward. 
If D is the ground of E, then E obtains because of D. If metaphysical explanation 
is concerned with constitution, then we can say that E is constituted by D. Any role 
that E plays, it plays because of the way it is and D is what makes E the way it is. 
So if E is involved in the scientific explanation of some other fact then D must also 
scientifically explain that other fact.
This allows us the run the argument against Humeanism again. The laws scientifi-
cally explain the mosaic, while the mosaic metaphysically explains the laws. By the 
transitivity principle, the mosaic must scientifically explain whatever the laws scien-
tifically explain as it is only in virtue of the mosaic being a certain way that we have 
these laws to explain with. Hence the mosaic scientifically explains itself.
14 The importance of manipulation and intervention to explanation is stressed in Woodward (2003).
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Bhogal makes the case that even if the Humean finds examples where this sort 
of explanatory transitivity fails, we still need an account of why this is sometimes 
taken to be possible:
For example, we can chain together (i) a scientific explanation of the facts 
about the energy of the particles in this room from facts about those particles 
ten minutes ago, with (ii) a metaphysical explanation of the fact about the cur-
rent temperature of the room in terms of facts about the energy of the particles 
in the room, to form (iii) a larger scientific explanation of the fact about the 
temperature in this room from the facts about the particles ten minutes ago 
(Bhogal 2017, p. 3).15
Clearly this sort of chaining together of explanations to form a scientific explana-
tion from the grounds of some other explanatory fact is sometimes done. This is 
prima facie motivation to think that Lange’s transitivity principle—or something 
very much like it—does hold. But the importance of this example is not merely to 
motivate that principle. Rather, it gives us a better understanding of the challenge 
that the Humean faces: the project is not only to show that the transitivity principle 
does not hold generally, but to do so in a way that does not condemn all instances of 
such explanatory transitivity. It must remain possible, after the Humean has offered 
a defence of the distinction between different types of explanations, for this chain-
ing together to sometimes be a legitimate move. Taking a straightforward example, 
this rules out claiming that each explanandum has a unique scientific explanans. An 
argument for this would rule out the transitivity principle, since E and the grounds 
of E would not be able to both scientifically explain some F, but would leave it com-
pletely mysterious as to why we think explanations like the one in Bhogal’s example 
are legitimate.
With this discussion in mind, we can now consider the explanatory circle argu-
ment that Humeans adopting Loewer’s distinction must face:
 (P1′) The natural laws are generalisations.
 (P2′) The truth of generalisations is (partially) metaphysically explained by their 
positive instances.
 (P3′) The natural laws scientifically explain their instances.
 (P4′) If A (partially) metaphysically explains B and B (partially) scientifically 
explains C, then A (partially) scientifically explains C.
 (C1′) The natural laws are (partially) metaphysically explained by their positive 
instances.
 (C2′) The instances of laws (partially) scientifically explain themselves.
Let us take this to be the objection that Humeans are challenged to overcome. The 
question now is how best to do that and the next two sections consider what I take 
to be the most promising line of response. In brief, the argument is that Humean 
15 I take the challenge raised by these chained explanations to be the same as that raised by the com-
bined explanations of Roski (2018).
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explanations function by way of subsuming events into more general patterns. This 
is at odds with the conception of explanation that anti-Humeans are working with. 
Fortunately for Humeanism, pattern-based explanations do not support the transitiv-
ity principle in (P4′). The final section makes this more explicit by connecting the 
approach to particular accounts of explanation and showing how they can respond to 
Bhogal’s challenge.
5  Explanation as pattern subsumption
We now turn to how to respond to the circularity challenge. Attempts have been 
made to question the direction of the grounding relations in play here or to recon-
sider the motivation for accepting the transitivity principle (Miller 2015; Hicks and 
van Elswyk 2015). However, I shall suggest that the problem lies in the notion of 
explanation being appealed to. The sense of explanation at play is a strong one and it 
is possible for Humeans to reject it as inappropriate given their wider commitments. 
Doing so opens up two possible routes of response to the circularity argument: (1) 
claim that laws are not able to explain their instances, or (2) develop an alternative 
view of explanation that allows for laws to explain their instances without thereby 
supporting a principle of transitivity. In what follows, I will set out both responses 
but focus more closely on the latter, as this is not in tension with scientific practice.
Much of the literature responding to the explanatory circle argument has avoided 
giving a full account of what scientific explanation involves. There are good prag-
matic reasons to do so: tying one’s response to a particular account of explanation 
creates problems if that account brings with it unanswered objections, and, further, 
Humeans themselves adopt a range of different accounts. It is undesirable to only 
respond to the circularity worry on behalf of those who are committed to the same 
particular details about explanation as oneself. However, despite the advantages of 
neutrality here, there is something substantial that we can say about the strength of 
the explanation involved: it is in conflict with the spirit of the Humean conception 
of the world. More specifically, advocates of the circularity argument are using a 
notion of explanation that requires the laws to play a role that Humeans themselves 
do not take the laws to be capable of playing. Consider the following quotations:
If one is a Humean, then the Humean Mosaic itself appears to admit of no fur-
ther explanation. Since it is the ontological bedrock in terms of which all other 
existent things are to be explicated, none of these further things can really 
account for the structure of the Mosaic itself (Maudlin 2007, p. 172, italics in 
original).
The Humean reduction seems to leave us without anything that has the requi-
site governance or guidance needed for lawfulness, that is, for control over the 
pattern of property instantiation as the world evolves.16
16 Paul (2013, p. 100), italics added for emphasis. Paul is reporting a wider concern with Humean laws, 
of which the issue with explanation is a specific instance.
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In short, if the Humean mosaic is responsible for making certain facts qualify 
as laws, then the facts about what the laws are cannot be responsible for fea-
tures of the mosaic (Lange 2013, p. 256, italics added for emphasis).
I take accounting for, control and responsibility to be different ways of capturing the 
same basic concept here. For simplicity, I’ll talk in terms of responsibility in what 
follows. In the third quotation, the first sort of responsibility is the sort of respon-
sibility that accompanies the grounding relation. Even if one is suspicious about 
grounding and distinctively metaphysical explanations, there is a clear sense in 
which Humeans take laws to be (partially) constituted by events in the mosaic. How-
ever, the second mention of responsibility is rather odd. On the Humean view, laws 
are mere descriptions. They do not govern or constrain or make anything happen. Of 
course they are not responsible for the mosaic; Humean laws are not responsible for 
anything! Ultimately, nothing is responsible for the mosaic being a certain way. It is 
a brute fact that the world is one with this pattern of events, as opposed to any other. 
This is captured by the famous Humean denial of necessary connections, the ban on 
which prevents anything from taking responsibility for the mosaic’s turning out one 
way rather than another.
The second part of Lange’s quote is picking out a core commitment of the 
Humean view, yet anti-Humeans take it to express an objection: that the laws are not 
responsible for the mosaic is supposed to be a problem. Perhaps the lack of respon-
sibility that laws show is an unattractive feature of the account for its detractors. But 
that in itself is not a strong objection, especially when Humeans find the notion of 
responsible laws mysterious. There is a question here of who this account of scien-
tific explanation is for. I take it that the account must be plausible to those who share 
in Humean presuppositions about the range of metaphysical resources available 
to work with. If an account must be attractive to even those who possess different 
worldviews, then we have set the bar too high for the vast majority of philosophical 
work to meet. A telling objection is one that its target will recognise as a challenge, 
whereas if the mosaic ultimately admits of no deeper explanation then the account’s 
lack of one does not look like a deficiency.
A belligerent Humean might wish to push this point. The problem with the 
explanatory circle argument is that it assumes that laws can scientifically explain 
their instances in the sense of being responsible for them. Since explanation here is 
being meant in a strong sense, such a Humean does not take laws to be capable of 
doing that. In effect, this is a rejection of the argument’s third premise. The explana-
tory circle is broken as one of the directions of explanation does not obtain. On this 
view there is no need to engage with the transitivity principle: while events in the 
mosaic metaphysically explain the laws, those laws do not scientifically explain the 
events and so there is no risk of the events scientifically explaining themselves.
Denying the third premise both blocks the circularity argument and fits in nicely 
with the Humean conception of laws as playing a descriptive role. But it comes at 
a great price, for this denial of their role in scientific explanations stands in conflict 
with both a commonsense belief about laws and how scientists are wont to use them. 
Perhaps the conflict with the folk usage can be explained away. After all, govern-
ance is commonly associated with laws but Humeans are committed to denying that 
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they play that role. A degree of revisionism might be justified on the grounds that 
it comes with a more attractive metaphysics. But the ascription of error to work-
ing scientists is not so easily dealt with. One of the main motivations for adopting a 
Humean view is a respect for science and a suspicion of claims that science cannot 
grasp the nature of the world without some form of metaphysically weighty supple-
mentation.17 To claim that scientists are misusing laws and should revise this usage 
on metaphysical grounds is, at the very least, in tension with this motivation.18
When confronted with the bullet that needs to be bitten on the route just 
described, many Humeans will wish instead for a more moderate line of response. 
Such a response will have to concede that laws can indeed help to explain their 
instances. It can, however, ask what reason there is to think that the kind of explana-
tion appealed to in the argument is the kind of explanation that Humean laws can 
provide. In other words, if anti-Humeans like Lange are appealing to a ‘thick’ form 
of explanation in their objection, then it is open to Humeans to rescue the explana-
tory role of laws by appealing to a ‘thinner’ form of explanation. The question that 
then remains is what kind of explanation is involved in this thin form.
Recall that Humean laws are nothing more than particularly efficient ways of 
marking out important patterns in the world’s events. Consequently, by Humean 
lights all scientific explanations that involve appeal to laws must thereby involve 
appeal to generalisations. To appeal to generalisations in this way is to draw the cur-
rent explanandum into a wider network of events, treating it as another instance of 
a general pattern. In other words, scientific explanations that involve laws should be 
treated as cases of subsumption under a pattern.
Such acts of explanation are not unusual. If we relax our focus from explanations 
offered by working scientists, we can see that they are, in fact, commonplace. This 
raven is black because all ravens are black. I sit at the back of the lecture theatre 
because all of the cool kids sit at the back of the class. The All Blacks performed 
a haka before their last match because they always perform a haka before matches.
This provides a way to avoid being committed to laws being responsible for 
events without ascribing widespread error to scientists. The explanation Humeans 
can provide of the laws is a constitutive one: the laws are grounded in the patterns 
that occur in the mosaic. The explanation of the mosaic via the laws cannot be one 
in which the laws are taken to have any responsibility for the goings-on in the world. 
Rather, the explanations that invoke the laws are explanations in the form of pat-
tern recognition. If I say that my pen falls because of gravity, I am pointing out that 
massive objects show a general pattern: they move towards one another. As my pen 
has mass, it is just another instance of this pattern. I have not attempted to iden-
tify something that acts on my pen to ensure that it moves downwards. Nor have I 
tried to find why this is a world with a gravity-pattern in it (that would presumably 
be an attempt to find a deeper reason that Lange takes appeals to regularities to be 
17 This is particularly clear in Lewis (1994, p. 474).
18 See Emery (2019, pp. 1541–1544) for a defence of the claim that the laws explain their instances. 




pointing towards). In fact, I had better not try to do this if I am a Humean! Ulti-
mately, there is no deep reason why the world is one with this pattern of events as 
opposed to another one. For Humeans, there simply is no explanation of that kind of 
the mosaic to be had.
The importance of this line of reply is not merely that it utilises a different sense 
of explanation to that employed by anti-Humeans in the debate. That alone would be 
insufficient because the circularity argument might simply be reformed with refer-
ence to this thinner sense. Notions like responsibility are useful in describing the 
challenge but are not directly appealed to in the argument itself. Rather, the impor-
tant point is that it undermines support for the argument’s fourth premise: the transi-
tivity principle. This principle has some plausibility when we think of explanations 
as offering something like causal information. If E brings about F, and E is really 
just made up from D, then it is not unreasonable to think that D brings about F. 
That kind of neat story is not available when it is patterns that we are interested in. 
Suppose that E explains F by treating it as part of some wider pattern and that E is 
grounded in D. There is nothing to guarantee that D will be able to explain F in the 
same way that E does as patterns evident amongst the E-facts might not be apparent 
amongst the D-facts. Recall that for Humeans, the laws are determined by balanc-
ing descriptions of the entire mosaic via the Best System Account. When a scien-
tific explanation is offered of some instance, that instance is being subsumed into 
the pattern captured by the law invoked in the explanation. If transitivity held, the 
instance would also be subsumed into a pattern at the level of the entire mosaic. But 
the whole mosaic is large and varied; it is not at all clear how it comprises a pattern 
under which any one instance could be subsumed.19
As this is clearer with an example, recall the contrasting explanations offered of 
Arbuthnot’s birth-rate regularity. Here we have the lower-level explanation in terms 
of facts about the configuration of fundamental particles and the higher-level expla-
nation in terms of a neo-Darwinian appeal to facts about vulnerability within a pop-
ulation and natural selection pressures. While both identify facts about the state of 
the world, we have already seen reason to prefer the latter one: the entire point of 
turning to an explanation like Fischer’s is that the particle-based explanation does 
not properly capture what we’re looking to get out of an explanation. The fact that 
the regularity still appears to be coincidental in an important sense in the lower-level 
explanation is evidence that the relevant pattern is not apparent when looking only at 
the lower-level facts.
This is still quite an abstract approach to the problem. The next section makes 
things more concrete by connecting this response to several positions on scientific 
explanation hospitable to Humean presuppositions. In doing so, the paper aims to 
show how these positions respond to the challenge raised by Bhogal and mentioned 
in the previous section. That is, to show how they can accommodate the kinds of 
examples used to motivate the transitivity principle without being required to accept 
it.
19 Thanks to Juha Saatsi for suggesting a clean way of expressing this point.
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6  Humean views of explanation
I have claimed both that the circularity argument against Humean laws requires a 
transitivity principle and that the Humean commitment to scientific explanations 
as pattern subsumption undermines such a principle. Yet Lange (2013; 2018) has 
offered various examples to motivate precisely that principle. The fourth section of 
this paper mentioned an example from Bhogal (2017, p. 3):
(i) a scientific explanation of the facts about the energy of the particles in this 
room from facts about those particles ten minutes ago, with (ii) a metaphysical 
explanation of the fact about the current temperature of the room in terms of 
facts about the energy of the particles in the room, [forms] (iii) a larger scien-
tific explanation of the fact about the temperature in this room from the facts 
about the particles ten minutes ago.
I took this to be a challenge and agreed that an account is owed of what is going on 
in examples like these. The aim of this section is to settle that account by showing 
that there are different ways of making sense of those explanations without thereby 
being committed to a troublesome transitivity principle.
Let’s begin with the classic deductive-nomological account. Consider how 
Hempel (1965, p. 488) talks about explanation:
We noted that scientific explanation is not aimed at creating a sense of famili-
arity with the explanandum; “reduction to the familiar” is at best an incidental 
aspect of it. The understanding it conveys lies rather in the insight that the 
explanandum fits into, or can be subsumed under, a system of uniformities 
represented by empirical laws or theoretical principles…The central theme of 
this essay has been, briefly, that all scientific explanation involves, explicitly or 
by implication, a subsumption of its subject matter under general regularities; 
that it seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phenomena by 
showing that they fit into a nomic nexus.
Note in particular the claim that scientific explanation involves subsumption under 
regularities. As has been discussed, this is a claim that Humeans should find them-
selves sympathetic to, given the Humean view of laws as particularly important reg-
ularities. Explanation on this account requires that the explanandum be derivable 
via a deductive argument from premises which essentially include at least one law. 
It’s possible for such explanations to cross different domains, most obviously when 
we have a case of theoretical reduction like that of thermodynamics to statistical 
mechanics.
This is exactly what’s going on in Bhogal’s example, of course. A Humean who 
accepts the deductive-nomological account of explanation can grant that this is a 
genuine case of scientific and metaphysical explanations being chained together. 
However, such a Humean need not grant that this gives us good reason to think that 
the transitivity principle holds. Rather, a more restricted principle holds: scientific 
explanation is transitive in this manner only when there exists a reduction of one 
theoretical domain to another. This is certainly not automatic—establishing the 
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existence of a reduction takes considerable effort from practicing scientists. That’s 
why the chaining of explanations is sometimes, but not always, possible.20 On this 
account of explanation, Humean explanations would only be circular if the relevant 
domain was reducible to the vocabulary of the mosaic, which solely describes per-
fectly natural properties connected by spacetime relations. Even though the mosaic 
is involved in the metaphysical explanation of all laws, particular instances of those 
laws are not scientifically explained by it since we do not have a principle that sup-
ports the chaining of those kinds of explanation in such situations.
In developing his unificationist account of explanation, Kitcher (1981, p. 508) 
quotes approvingly from Hempel (1966, p. 83):
What scientific explanation, especially theoretical explanation, aims at is not 
[an] intuitive and highly subjective kind of understanding, but an objective 
kind of insight that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the 
phenomena as manifestations of common, underlying structures and processes 
that conform to specific, testable, basic principles.
This is taken to be the more promising unofficial view that underlies the deductive-
nomological account and forms the motivation for the unificationist one. This lat-
ter account claims that scientific explanation aims at unification, understood as the 
reduction of the number of facts that must be accepted as basic. From these basic 
facts, our explanations aim to derive as wide a range of kinds of events as possible. 
Put another way, the greater the range of phenomena that can be subsumed under a 
general pattern, the better the explanation. As has been noted by Woodward (2017), 
this fits nicely alongside a view that has laws occur in these explanations, and further 
claims that the laws are the result of a competition to find the best way to balance 
simplicity against comprehensiveness. If, for this reason, scientific explanation aims 
to unify by showing how a given explanandum is an instance of a law (and so dem-
onstrates that the explanandum does not need to be accepted as basic), then it aims 
to draw that explanandum into a wider regularity. In doing so, the Humean unifica-
tionist is committed to basing scientific explanation around pattern subsumption.21
Perhaps unsurprisingly given its origins, the unificationist account judges 
Bhogal’s example and the transitivity principle in a similar way to the 
20 The reduction here cannot be merely an in-principle ontological reduction. As everything reduces to 
the fundamental mosaic, understanding reduction in that sense would do nothing to block the transitiv-
ity principle. What’s required instead is a form of linguistic reduction that shows that the higher-level 
phenomenon is covered by the lower-level laws. Providing such a reduction demonstrates why there is 
a transitivity to the pattern subsumption here: as the higher-level regularities can be expressed in terms 
of the lower-level ones, phenomena deducible from the former regularities are also deducible from the 
latter regularities. Assuming the deduction meets the other requirements of the deductive-nomological 
account, we have a successful explanation at both levels. While controversial, Nagel’s (1961) model of 
theoretical reduction both captures the relevant sense of reduction and aligns with the deductive-nomo-
logical account—further development in this area is an important desideratum for Humeans who adopt 
this view of explanation.
21 Armstrong (1983) takes unification to be a mark of explanation when criticising the regularity account 




deductive-nomological account. A transitivity principle holds when the grounding 
facts have been shown to be more basic than the grounded ones, in the sense that the 
grounded phenomena have been unified under the grounding phenomena. In such 
cases we can derive the explanandum from the more basic facts. Again, showing that 
this is possible is not automatic and is not achieved from the comfort of the philoso-
phy armchair. Chaining is possible in Bhogal’s example because of the reduction of 
the thermodynamic facts. It is not possible in general since not all facts have been 
shown to be derivable from a set of basic ones. The more general principle required 
by the circularity argument itself requires the unification of all scientific domains 
under facts about the mosaic. This is something that we clearly have not achieved.
Both the unificationist and deductive-nomological accounts are well-established 
accounts of explanation compatible with a Humean approach to metaphysics.22 
Given their broadly similar motivations however, one might worry that the approach 
advocated here is unnecessarily restrictive, leaving out other accounts of explanation 
that Humeans might adopt. While an analysis of every compatible account is beyond 
the scope of a single paper, I will now turn to a more recent proposal that differs in 
an important respect to those just covered.
Dorst (2019) suggests that to respond to the circularity argument we should re-
emphasise Loewer’s distinction between metaphysical and scientific explanations. 
On the proposed view, the virtues invoked by the Best System Account that guide 
the choice of laws are taken to be constitutive of lawhood. In a similar vein, the 
explanatory virtues that guide theory choice are taken to be constitutive of theoreti-
cal truth: whichever theory best satisfies those virtues is true. We care about such 
virtues, and so about which theories are true, because of their predictive utility. So, 
in the scientific domain, theoretical truth drops out of predictive utility. In meta-
physics, this is not the case. Without needing to take a stand on what the precise 
aims of metaphysics are, we can say that they are not based around predictive util-
ity. As a result, the truth of metaphysical theories cannot be due to their supporting 
prediction.
Scientific and metaphysical explanations, then, are claimed to have different 
aims. This undercuts the motivation for thinking that the transitivity principle holds: 
why think that these two activities with different ends should always be linked in 
such a way? In the case of examples like Bhogal’s, Dorst’s view is that these are 
not mixtures of scientific and metaphysical explanations. Rather, these are scien-
tific explanations being chained together to form another scientific explanation.23 
The motivation for this claim is one we have already encountered: the reduction of 
23 Despite the view’s motivations, this brings out an important difference between Dorst and Loewer in 
his (2012). The latter takes grounding to be a mark of metaphysical explanation, while the former allows 
grounding relations to occur in explanations that are solely scientific. Whether this price of accepting 
Dorst’s view is a significant one depends on what one makes of the relationship between grounding and 
explanation more generally.
22 There are standard objections that have been raised to both; Woodward (2003) provides a thorough 
overview. In responding to the circularity argument by appealing to any favoured account of explanation, 
Humeans may be issuing a promissory note. It is the role of future research in this area to make good on 
that promise by further developing a plausible view of explanation that responds to the counterexamples.
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thermodynamics to statistical mechanics is the result of scientific work rather than 
that of metaphysicians. In contrast, the grounding of the laws in the mosaic is clearly 
a metaphysical explanation: this claim forms no part of current scientific practice. 
As transitivity only applies across scientific explanations, the Humean grounding 
claim cannot be used to form a circle of scientific explanation.
A view of explanation like Dorst’s does not explicitly appeal to patterns, but the 
same line of reasoning used in the previous section is at play here too. Even when E 
scientifically explains F, the grounding of E in D does not ensure that D thereby sci-
entifically explains F. A further story is required, one taken from scientific practice 
that shows us how we can use the occurrence of D-facts in conjunction with laws 
to predict the occurrence of F-facts. As a Humean view, it is an underlying appeal 
to patterns that enables this prediction. We might not be able to predict an event 
because we know that relevant governing laws are responsible for bringing it about, 
but we can predict on the basis that it will be another instance of a wider pattern of 
similar events.
How similar is my proposal to a recent one by Bhogal (forthcoming)?24 Like this 
paper, Bhogal also accepts Loewer’s distinction between metaphysical and scientific 
explanation and finds reason to reject the transitivity premise in non-chaining cases. 
Similarly to Dorst, he does this by taking those explanations to be different activi-
ties with different aims. Metaphysical explanation is taken to be tied to grounding, 
while scientific explanation is understood as unificationism in the spirit of Friedman 
(1974). Since attempts to explain instances of laws by way of reference to the entire 
mosaic do not provide unification, they fail to count as genuine scientific explana-
tions and so cannot serve as evidence of an explanatory circle.
As mentioned earlier in this section, I take my proposal to be compatible with the 
unificationist stance and so also with Bhogal’s approach. However, there are some 
differences between our views. The most important is that this paper aims at neu-
trality between the various accounts of explanation on offer in the literature. While 
pattern subsumption fits well with a unificationist position on explanation, it is not 
tied to that account alone: the point of this section and the previous one has been to 
show why multiple extant accounts of explanation do not support a transitivity prin-
ciple when combined with a Humean worldview. Transitivity might be supported by 
a form of scientific explanation associated with notions like responsibility, but the 
above accounts are examples of how we can approach explanation without such an 
association.
While Dorst and Bhogal make particular claims about the aims of science—pre-
diction and unification respectively—this paper remains neutral. I claim that (law-
ful) scientific explanation has a pattern-subsuming feature in virtue of the descrip-
tive nature of laws on the Humean account. However, this should not be taken as 
commitment to any one view regarding what science aims to achieve. The goal of 
this section has been to show that pattern-subsuming explanations can feature in 
accounts that take the activity of explaining to be aiming at deduction, unification 
or prediction. The reason for this form of neutrality is to aim for compatibility with 
24 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pushing me on this connection.
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as wide a range of existing accounts of explanation as possible.25 A strength of this 
compatibility is that it shows how a variety of Humeans can respond to the circular-
ity argument, as opposed to only those who have a shared conception of scientific 
goals. It means that Humeans have greater options regarding what to make of expla-
nation and are not tied to the success or failure of a single account.26
7  Conclusion
While the threat of circularity has long dogged the Humean account of laws, this 
paper has argued that the objection is based on a view of explanation that Humeans 
are free to reject. Even stronger than that, Humeans have good reason to reject it as 
there is an alternative account that fits more closely with the commitment to laws 
as regularities. If the laws are descriptions of patterns, then scientific explanations 
invoking laws explain by way of showing that the explanandum in question is an 
element of some pattern. Explanations based on pattern subsumption do not support 
the circularity argument as they defy the transitivity principle: that our understand-
ing of the explanandum is increased by seeing how it fits into a pattern amongst cer-
tain facts does not mean that there will be a similar increase in understanding from 
a description of the phenomenon in terms of other facts (and similarly for predictive 
utility).
In the fourth section, we saw that part of the challenge of accounting for how 
Humean laws explain was that we sometimes reason as if transitivity does hold. This 
was Bhogal’s problem of chaining: if the transitivity principle does not hold gener-
ally, why is it that some metaphysical and scientific explanations can be chained 
together to form a legitimate scientific explanation? Specifically, why is it that we 
can chain together scientific facts about energy over time with metaphysical facts 
about the connection between energy and temperature to form a scientific explana-
tion of a room’s temperature over time?
The sixth section went some way to answer this, pointing out that exactly what 
is going on in the motivating examples depends on the view of explanation that one 
subscribes to. But in all cases, the grounding of some facts in certain other facts is 
not by itself sufficient to support the transitivity principle. Instead, something more 
is required, whether that be the unification of phenomena under a set of more basic 
25 A further example of this is the counterfactual account of explanation, which has been rising in popu-
larity (Woodward 2003; Saatsi and Pexton 2013; Reutlinger 2018). On this account, the purpose of scien-
tific explanation is to enable us to answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions rather than to unify 
phenomena. The dependence relations underlying such answers are plausibly amenable to a Humean 
treatment but, as Bhogal is committed to unification being the aim of scientific explanation, he cannot 
avail himself of such a move. Neutrality has its advantages here.
26 Bhogal in his (forthcoming) briefly suggests not being tied to ‘surface level’ unificationist accounts 
like those of Friedman or Kitcher. It might be that, like this paper, he intends something with wider 
appeal. Even if so, we still make different claims regarding the aim(s) of scientific explanation. This is 
why he treats Dorst’s position as a competitor: it makes a different specific claim about what scientists 




facts, supporting the making of predictions, or something else entirely. The fact 
that some explanandum can be subsumed under a pattern does not imply that the 
grounds of that pattern will automatically serve as the scientific explanans of that 
explanandum.
This has not been an examination of scientific explanation in its full generality. 
The focus of the paper was rather on scientific explanations that make ineliminable 
appeal to laws. One might wonder whether there are any scientific explanations that 
do not involve laws and, if so, what a Humean might have to say about those. How-
ever, the circularity worry was not motivated by how Humeans treat scientific expla-
nations in general, but by how they treat the laws that, at least some of the time, are 
involved in those explanations. In short, a scientific explanation that makes no men-
tion of regularities will not be viciously circular since it lacks the allegedly circular 
feature. The question of how to treat such explanations remains, of course, but the 
answer is dependent upon one’s views on scientific explanation more generally. The 
purpose of this paper is to argue that Humean theories of explanation should have 
a feature in common with each other, one that prevents them from being circular in 
the way anti-Humeans suggest. This is compatible with there being more than one 
theory of explanation available: individual Humeans should look to their favoured 
one to determine how they should treat these lawless cases.
In concentrating on the most influential recent formulation of the explanatory cir-
cle argument, I have not directly engaged with alternative formulations that might be 
raised. As an instructive example of how Humeans might adapt the position in this 
paper to those alternatives, I will comment briefly on Emery’s (2019) argument.27 
This is based on the conjunction of three claims:
 (E1) Laws explain their instances.
 (E2) Laws do not cause their instances.
 (E3) If the Fs explain the Gs and the Fs don’t cause the Gs, then the Fs ground the 
Gs.
From these it follows that the laws ground their instances. If successful, this argu-
ment would undermine Loewer’s distinction as a way to respond to the circularity 
objection: as the laws are grounded in their instances and also ground their instances, 
Humeans are committed to circular grounding. Since grounding is tightly connected 
to metaphysical explanation, such a circle would result in metaphysical self-expla-
nation. Setting aside the belligerent Humean of Sect. 5, Humeans have little quarrel 
with (E1) or (E2). The point of divergence is therefore the third claim. Emery does 
offer a defence of this, pointing out that it fits several examples of explanations in 
science and has an important virtue: it is the simplest plausible account on offer.
Plausibility matters here, since a simpler account is one which takes all explana-
tion to be causation. As Emery (2019, p. 1546) rightly notes, the cost of accepting 
such an account is too high to be outweighed by the gain in simplicity. However, 
this opens the door for Humeans to adopt an account of scientific explanation from 
27 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this comparison.
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the literature as indicated previously. Such accounts are independently motivated, 
forestalling accusations of this being an ad hoc move. They offer more sophisticated 
treatments of explanation than does the account present in (E3), offsetting the loss 
in simplicity by gains in how closely they reflect scientific practice or accommo-
date difficult examples.28 Perhaps Emery is right to think that there is some cost to 
accepting explanatory relations beyond causation and grounding. If so, it is one that 
many philosophers of science are willing to pay. Contemporary Humeans think that 
the mosaic serves as the grounding base for all the nonfundamental facts. While 
those facts are grounded in the mosaic, the mosaic itself is not grounded in any fur-
ther facts—including those concerning laws. As such, Humeanism comes with a 
need to find an account of scientific explanation where laws do not ground their 
instances.
The Humean view is often associated with a suspicion of ‘heavy-duty’ metaphys-
ics, the kind that introduces irreducible necessity into the world. The cost of avoid-
ing such commitments is a thinness to the resulting explanations. To some, this cost 
will render the position unattractive: recall Lange’s point about the laws not being 
responsible for features of the mosaic. The aim of this paper has not been to sway the 
anti-Humean camp on this. More modestly, it has been to show that if one is willing 
to accept Humean presuppositions about the world and the available metaphysical 
resources, then it is still possible to provide a sense in which laws can explain that 
does not require attributing widespread error to the scientific community. A conse-
quence of the Humean account is that thicker explanations of the world’s events are 
not available: it is ultimately a brute fact that we have this mosaic rather than any 
other. As such, the restriction to thinner explanations is no substantial cost to the 
Humean position.29
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